En this paper, we offer a systeraatic clas §ification of both the metaphoric and the metonymic mappings underlying the notion of time in English. The main conclusión which can be drawn from this cognitive approach to the study of time in EngUsh is that time is not a basic notion. For contemporary EngUsh speakers, at least, reasoning and speaking about time always involves some kind of metaphoric or metonymic projection. In addition to this, we have also considered some interesting cases of conceptual interaction, in which independent metaphors and metonymies of time combine with each other in order to make possible the understanding and the expression of complex temporal thoughts in EngUsh.
INTRODUCTION: ON THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT TIME (1) Time is what we measure in minutes, hours, days, and years.
(2) Time is that part of existence which is measured in seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years, etc., or «Time» is a complex concept. As the examples above show, succinct propositional definitions of time are largely unhelpful for a number of reasons, among which we may point to their triviality, vagueness, and/or circularity. Some of them, like 1 and 2, are partial, focusing of just one aspect of time such as its measurable nature; others, like 3 and 4, are too technical; and yet others, Hke 5 and 6, are hardly reveahng-^. None of them is capable of providing the hearer with a clear idea of the meaning of time. Even philosophers' reflections on the nature of this notion often appear to contradict each other. Plato held time to be «motion» or, more specifically, the «circular motion of the heavens». Aristotle thought of time as the «measure of motion». St. Augustine claimed that time did not exist in reality, but only in the mind's apprehension of that reality. In a similar vein, Kant considered time to be a «form» that the mind projects upon the extemal things: people have no direct perception of time, but only the ability to experience things and events in time.
Amidst this array of diverse conceptualisations of time, there is one issue which seems to have received constant attention from the first philosphical theories to our days, namely, the interdejjendence or interrelationship between time and space. Plato's and Aristotle's linking of time to motion pointed to a conceptual dependence of time on space, since motion necessarily takes place within some spatial dimensión. In the I?* century, Newton argued that time and space are both «reference frames», neither dependent on the other, but both providing an infmitely large container for all events. In the 20"^ century, the theory of relativity united time and space in the concept of «spacetime», a certain 4-d space in which time constitutes the fourth dimensión.
The discussion about the relationship between time and space has also been considered from the point of view of human conceptuaüsation. Linguists, psychologuists, and cognitive scientists have attempted to unveil the conceptual relationship between these notions. Is space a component of our understanding of time, or vice versa? Again, it is possible to find two opposing views which parallel the two philosphical and scientifíc stances presented above. Langacker (1987:149) contends that time is a primitive, non-derived, basic notion:
I will refer to a primitive representational field of this sort as a hasic domain. (...) The experience of time certainly suggests itself as a primitive dimensión of cognitive representation. The fact that we often conceive and speak of time in spatial teims only shows the utility of such metaphor for higher-level conceptualization. It does not imply that the experience of time is reducible to a purely spatial one; if anything, the opposite would seem more plausible (...) time is in some sense more fundamental than space: the conception of spatial relationships involves scanning, which requieres processing time... The «time as a primitive notion» stance seems to be in accordance with scientifíc postúlales (i.e. theory of relativity), as shown above. Linguistic evidence of transfer from time to space, however, is scarce. Haspelmath (1997: 142) records the case of the French preposition depuis, which originaly meant «after», but then came to mean «since» and to acquire a spatial sense as in «depuis la fenétre» (from the window). Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 152) record another type of expression where time duration stands metonymically for distance: San Francisco is half an hour from Berkeley. Here, the time it teikes to travel this distance stands for the distance. Nevertheless, these types of timespace transfer are extremely rare.
On the other hand, there is the «time as a derived notion» position, which is briefly summarised in the following quotation from Mandler (1996: 374): It is known, of course, that languages tend to represent time by borrowing spatial terms (Fillmore, 1982; Traugott, 1978) . I think the reason is that it's easier to think about objects moving along paths than to think about time without any spatial aids (...) temporal Information is evanescent, and it may be difficult to analyze without the help of previously acquired meanings (...) In this view, the concept of «time» is not a primitive notion but derived.
The time as a «derived notion» position has received the largest amount of support to date. Typological studies, like Hapelmath's (1997), reveal that spatial expression of temporal notions is extremely widespread in the world's languages. He draws cross-linguistic evidence from the analysis of NP-based time adverbials in a sample of 53 languages. Alverson's (1994) work shows how space functions as a source domain for metaphors of time in four languages as diverse as English, Mandarín, Hindi, and Sesotho. In their study on the evolution of tense, aspect, and modality in the languages of the world, Bybee et al. (1994) point out the fact that tense markers go back to aspectual constructions which are often based on space (e.g. She is going to buy a new house). In addition to typological studies, etymological information suggests that the space sense of English prepositions, like befare, after and the like, was chronologicaly primary'. Psycholinguists, like Clark (1971 Clark ( , 1973 , and Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) , and ethnographists, such as Beidelman (1963) , Givens (1977) , Thomton (1980) , and Keesing (1991) have provided concordant data. Finally, cognitive linguists have also attested the conceptual dependency of time on space in relation to mental phenomena like metaphor and metonymy (see Lakoff and Tumer, 1989; Johnson, 1980, 1999) .
The question of whether time is conceptually dependent on the notion of space is part of a broader issue, namely, whether time can be conceptualised independently of other notions at all. One of the aims of this paper is to contribute some more evidence supporting the hypotheses according to which (1) time is not a prímitive concept and (2) human understanding of time is based upon or derived from the exf)erience of space or motion along space. Moreover, it is contended that space is just one of several notions upon which the understanding of time hinges. In this connection, it is argued that time is conceptualised via metaphoríc and metonymic operations on generic cognitive models («image-schemas» like those of «path», «container», «object», and «forcé», on the one hand; and «propositional generic cognitive models», like those of «situations» and «events», on the other hand) *. Most existing accounts ' Befare stems from Oíd English be +fore (in front of). After is related to the Oíd English adverb eft (meaning back). In this connection, Hill (1982) and Carón (1998: 36-44) note that the spatial orientation given by the body is reproduced in the representation of time in English and Hausa. Furthermore, time adverbs, like ago, are etymologically linked to motion verbs and, therefore, indirectly, also to space. According to the Merriam Webster's CoUegiate Dictionary of English, ago comes from Oíd English a-(perfective prefix) and gan (to go).
' Ruiz de Mendoza (1999a) has made a distinction between generic and non-generic cognitive models. Generic models are those which occupy the highest levéis in a conceptual hierarchy. In other words, generic models are not hierarchically derived from other notions. Examples of generic models are image schemas like those in Johnson's (1987) taxonomy and some propositional models like those of action, event, plans-goals, cause-consequence, etc. Non-generic models are hierarchically derived from generic models. The cognitive models of killing and kissing, for instance, would be non-generic subcases of the action model. of the conceptualisation of time in English have focused on its metaphorical basis (Alverson, 1994; Haspelmath, 1997) . Nevertheless, as shall be shown in section 2.2, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) have also timidly pointed to the working of metonymic operations in the understanding of temporal expressions. This paper offers a systematic classification of both the metaphoric and the metonymic mappings underlying the notion of time in English. Furthermore, unlike previous studies, the present analysis is based on a sample of over 400 instances of time-related expressions extracted from the British National Corpus. The main conclusión which will be drawn is that time is not a basic notion. For contemporary English speakers, at least, reasoning and speaking about time always involves some kind or metaphoric of metonymic projection. What's more, our corpus reveáis that metaphors and metonymies of time very often combine with each other giving way to complex pattems of conceptual interation. In addition to these three basic metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 158, 161ff ) also refer to some other isolated metaphors of time such as TIME IS A RESOURCE, TIME IS MONEY, and TIME IS A FLOWING RIVER.
The analysis of our collection of examples reveáis that the number of metaphors underlying the concept of time is actually bigger than that included in the Índex of metaphors and in Lakoff and Johnson's taxonomy. Furthermore, it is observed that it is possible to distinguish three general time metaphors and to establish a hierarchy of dependency of other more specific instances of each of them. This hierarchical description of the metaphor system of time in English easily accommodates those metaphors of time which appeared as isolated and unrelated mappings in Lakoff and Johnson's account (i.e. TIME IS A RESOURCE, TIME IS MONEY, TIME IS A FLOWING RIVER). Our fíndings regarding the metaphorical cognitive structure of time are summarised below. Each metaphor is accompanied by some corresponding linguistic instantiations:
1. TIME IS SPACE It is obvious that Lakoff and Johnson's basic metaphors are simply subcases of the TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT or TIME IS SPACE mappings. A more comprehensive and detailed classification of the metaphors of time in English, like the one presented here, makes it possible to deal with some problematic instances in Lakoff and Johnson's proposal. By way of illustration, consider the foUowing expressions:
(7) She arrived on time. (8) What will be the length ofhis visit? (9) Let's spread the visit over two weeks. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 146) argüe that, since time is metaphorically seen as a path over which the observer moves, it has extensión and can be measured. On this basis, they regard examples (7)- (9) as instances of the TIME IS A MOVING OBSERVER metaphor. However, it is clear that the notion of «path» is not dependent on the existence of an observer moving along it. We may make use of the notions of «path», «length of a path» and/or «location on a path» in order to reason about certain aspects of time, such as its duration, without activating the image of a moving observer. In our accoimt (7) and (9) would be instances of the TIME IS AN ÁREA metaphor; and (8) would instantiate the TIME IS A PATH metaphor.
* I only include in this description two well-known subtypes of the TIMES IS A CHANGER metaphor. I am not listing all the special cases, which occur mainly in poetry, and which are discussed in Lakoff and Tumer (1989) .
A similar problem is posed by examples like (10) below:
(10) He ran a mile infive minutes.
In a passing reference to the metaphorical understanding of time as a container, Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 153) suggest that this is also part of the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor. Thus, they argüe that in an utterance like (10), which indicates a fixed duration, time is conceptualised as a bounded región on a path along which an observer moves. Again, it is far from evident that the understanding of temporal expressions which make use of the preposition in should involve the idea for a «moving observer» or in Lakoff s own words, of an observer moving along a path where each location is mapped onto a point in time. In example (10), the preposition in simply motivates an understanding of time in terms of a bounded space. More specifically, it activates the image schema of a container. According to the intemal logic of this image schema (Johnson, 1987) , the boundaries of the container impose some restrictions on the entities inside it and on their actions. Thus, the expression in fifteen minutes restricts the amount of time, which is metaphorically being conceptualised as space, and in doing so, it also constrains the action of the participant in a certain way.
Consider the following related examples from our corpus: In none of these examples is it necessary to actívate a path schema or movement along it, in order to understand the meaning of the time expressions in italics. The mapping of the source image-schema of a container onto the target domain of time serves one main purpose which is to make it possible for US to think and speak of time as being limited. Just as a container is held within its boundary, time is bound: it has a beginning and an end. Whether the observer is moving is not relevant for the interpretation of these examples. Because of this and in contrast to what Lakoff and Johnson (1999) postúlate, I have preferred to include an independent mapping (i.e. TIME IS A CONTAINER) in my description of the metaphor-based cluster model of time. As will be shown below, this metaphor can occasionally, but not necessarily, be combined with others in order to give rise to more complex time expressions.
It is also interesting to note that the metaphors underlying the concept of time are not arbitrary. The source domains of our time metaphors are either concrete and/or easily apprehensible everyday Ufe concepts, Hke «money», «resource», «possession», etc.; or experiential ideahsed pre-conceptual image schemas, such as those of «space» («path», «container»), «object/matter», and «forcé». In spite of being abstractions, the latter can function as source domains of metaphoric mappings, because they have a strong bodily basis which enables its direct comprehension. In this, they differ from other abstract notions like «love», «happiness», or «time» itself, whose understanding is always mediated by some metaphoric mapping. As pointed out by Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 139-153) , the experiential basis of the source domains of time metaphors is linked to some biological characteristics of the human race. Our visual systems are provided with detectors for motion and detectors for objects and locations, but we lack detectors for time itself. Therefore, it is only natural that time should be understood in terms of those other concepts.
The question may be raised as to whether one of these metaphors is more central or essential for the understanding of time. Careful consideration of the expressions in the corpus points towards a negative answer. Each of the metaphoric mappings in the system focuses on one specific aspect of the meaning of time: duration, limits, effects, valué, etc. Depending on the situation and the communicative needs of the speaker, one or more of the proposed metaphorical models will have to be instantiated linguistically in order to convey the intended thought about time. In this connection, it can be stated that there exists a metaphor-based cluster model of time as schematised in the following figure ': The canonical theory of cluster models only considers the possibility of the convergence of propositional idealised cognitive models (see Lakoff, 1987: 74ff) . As shown above, abstract concepts, like time, are also conceptualised through the convergence of a number of cognitive models, only that these are metaphorical in nature. Metaphor-based cluster models display a number of idiosyncratic characteristics which origínate in the different abstract nature of the type of concept to which they apply. First, metaphor-based clusters not only contain organised knowledge about a concept, but most importantly, each of the models of which they consist constitutes a conceptual tool that enables us to reason and speak about a concept which, due to its abstract nature, cannot be propositionally described. On the contrary, proposition-based clusters are just a means of organising our knowledge about a concept in a systematic way. Second, metaphor-based clusters do not give rise to different degrees of membership. English speakers need all three models described above in order to be able to think and talk about time on different occasions, but they do not need to actívate the three models simultaneously in order to instantiate the prototypical sense of time. In contrast to this, proposition-based clusters are a source of prototype effects: the most prototypical member of the category is that in which all the models converge and the absence of one or more submodels results in less central cases of the category '".
English metonymies of time
There are many events in the womb of timelwhich will be delivered (Othello, Act 1, Scene 3, Line 370).
The relationship between time and events is a very narrow one. Events take place within the confines of time. In tum, time is largely measured by comparing events. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 139) emphasise the dependency of time measurement on event comparison: on the following individual models: the birth modal (i.e. the person who gives birth is the «mot-her»), the genetic model (i.e. the female who contributes the genetic material is the «mother»), the nurturance model (i.e. the female adult who nunures and raises a child is the «mother» of hat child), the marital model (i.e. the wife of the father is the «mother»), the genealogical model (i.e. the closest female ancestor is the «mother»).
'" For a more detailed discussion of the differences between metaphor-based and proposition-based cluster models, see Pérez (forthcoming).
We choose certain canonical events as temporal «yardstícks»: the movement of the hands of an analog clock or the sequential flashing of numbers on a digital clock. These in tum are defined relative to other events -the movement of the sun, a pendulum, or wheels, or the reléase of subatomic particles. Literal time is a matter of event comparison...
As Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 138) reveal, we define time by metonymy: regular occurrences of certain types of events stand for intervals of time. This is a direct consequence of the fact that we cannot observe time itself, but we can observe and compare the events that occur in time. What are commonly known as canonical time periods (days, nights, years, seasons, etc.) are actually events. A «year» is the event of the earth completing its rotary movement ciround the sun; «days» and «nights» are the events of the altemation of light and dark respectively, etc. These natural events have come to stand for the time they take to unfold. As Haspelmath (1997: 25) remarks, we are so used to these cyclic events that we do not think of them as such any more, but we mostly focus on their function as time measuring units.
In spite of this cióse relationship between the notions of event and time, very little attention has been devoted to its exploration. Together with the reference to time measurement in terms of event comparison, Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 154) have pointed to the existence of the EVENT FOR TIME metonymy. They offer the foUowing two examples:
(16) The Kronos Quartet Concert is approaching. (17) Harry had a heart attack during the rock concert.
In (16), the event of the concert stands for the time of the concert and in (17), the rock concert stands metonymically for the «length» of time during which the rock concert took place.
Following this interesting line of inquiry, our corpus has been searched in order to identify further time metonymies. Before presenting the results of our search, however, I deem it necessary to define briefly the concept of metonymy as it is used in this paper. I understand «metonymy», as defined by Ruiz de Mendoza (1997a: 171) , simply as a «one-correspondence conceptual mapping within a single domain where, if the target is part of the source, the target is not a primary or central sub-domain of the source». Consider the following expressions taken from Croft (1993: 350 In his discussion of Croft's analysis of these two examples, Ruiz de Mendoza (1997a: 167) shows that (18) is a clearer case of metonymy than (19). The reason for this is that the target of the mapping in (18) is not a central subdomain of the source, as is the case in (19). The following figures illustrate the two possible mappings underlying the metonymic interpretation of (18) TTie subdomain «window pane» is an optional component of the concept «window». We may have a window without a window pane. On the contrary, «opening» is a central or primary subdomain of «window», since all windows involve a certain opening in a wall, a roof, etc. Ruiz de Mendoza (1997a: 167) observes that (18), in which the target is not a central subdomain of the source, is a metonymic expression. In contrast (19), in which the target is a central subdomain, is not.
Other purported distinguishing criteria between metonymies and metaphors put forward by Lakoff and his collaborators have been shown not to qualify as definitional criteria by Ruiz de Mendoza (1997a: 164-166) . Lakoff and Tumer (1989: 108) contend that (1) metonymy has a predominantly referential character while metaphors are used mainly predicatively, and (2) metonymy correspondences are of the «stand for» type, while metaphors are mappings of the «is a» type. Regarding (1), Ruiz de Mendoza (1997a: 164) notes that not only metonymies are commonly used predicatively, as in John is a real hrain, but metaphors are also often used referentially, as in The pig is waitingfor his check. In relation to (2), Ruiz de Mendoza (1997a: 164) draws attention to the fact that in referential uses of metaphor, the source domain also «stands for» the target domain. Thus, in The pig is waiting for his check, «the pig» also stands for the customer. This observation points to a cióse connection between the so-called «stand for» relationship and the referential use of both metaphorical and metonymic expressions, and, therefore, disqualifies the «stand for» relationship as a definitional criterion for metonymies.
Going back to our analysis of time metonymies, it is observed firstly that all the instances in our sample are referential in nature: they are used to achieve successful reference to either a specific point in time or to a time lapse in a cognitively económica! way. Take the following examples: In (20), after John ran the marathón stands for «after the time when John was running the marathón». In (21), when Elvis was numher 1 in the charts stands for the exact year or years when Elvis was number 1 in the charts. Remembering the exact time when the speakers went to diñe or the exact years when the speaker was finishing his degree would involve a considerable cognitive cost in terms of memory effort. Nevertheless, almost every member of the westem community knows that Elvis was number 1 in the sixties, and in the context of (20), the approximate time when the marathón took place is most probably a known fact for that community of speakers. Therefore, by referring to those events, the speaker activates the adequate time reference with minimum cognitive effort, and the addressee is capable of retrieving that Information with little cognitive cost.
It should be further noted that most of the time metonymies that will be described below have a high degree of conventionalization, so much so that in most cases sf)eakers are not aware of the fact that there is, in fact, a metonymic mapping underlying their expressions. Time metonymies are similar, in this respect, to the well-known Lakoffian example of conventional metonymy He played cards ", in which an element of the general domain of «playing the game of cards», namely, the element «cards» stands for the whole domain. This type of metonymy is so highly conventionalised that it usually goes unnoticed.
Our Corpus also reveáis that just like events, states, which also take place along time or at specific points in time, can similarly be found to function as the source domains of time metonymies. Consider the following example: " Example taken from the Master Metonymy List, a compilation of over 100 metonymies, carried out by Naomi Liete from references found in the cognitive linguistics literature or obtained from homework assignments in Lakoff's classes. The State of being pregnant stands for a specific and highly salient lapse of time in the life of Mary and thus, enables the speaker to refer in an economical way to the length of time that Mary worked for Starbucks. Consequently, it is possible to posit the existence of a STATE FOR TIME metonymy, in which States (source domain) stand metonymically for the «length» of time that they last (target domain), as shown in the following figure: (23)-(25) below, where the time expression hinges on a double metonymic mapping (1) from one element of an event or state frame onto the whole frame, and (2) from the event or state frame to the domain of time:
(23) Befare Napoleón, France was a peaceful country. Napoleón is just one element of a certain event frame such as Napoleón hecame the ruler of France. In (23), Napoleón metonymically stands for the whole event frame, which in tum stands for a specific time in history (i.e. 1799, the ye2ir when Napoleón became the ruler of France): hefore Napoleón is interpreted as hefore the time when Napoleón became the ruler of France, that is to say, hefore 1799.
Note also that Napoleón could potentially stand for a large number of diverse event or state frames (e.g. Napoleón invaded Russia, Napoleón was sentenced to a life long exile on the Isle of Elba, etc.). Nevertheless, other linguistic elements in the utterance under consideration contribute to the instantiation of the correct frame. The element Frunce, for instance, leads to an instantiation of a frame linked to the history of this specific country. In a similar utterance, hke Befare Napoleón, Russia was a prosperous country, in which Napoleón is considered in relation with the history of Russia, the most Hable frame for activation would be Napoleón invaded Russia in 1812. Thus, in this case, the expression Befare Napoleón would stand for the fuU proposition Befare the time when Napoleón invaded Russia, that is to say, befare 1812. Contextual Information or linguistic elements, like Franee and Russia, constrain the number and nature of the temporal propositions which may be instantiated by a metonymic expression like befare Napoleón. (23) In example (24), a cup oftea metonymically stands for the event frame of «drinking a cup of tea», which in tum stands for the «length of time which is generally taken to drink a cup of tea». In this case, it is not the agent, but the patient of the action which stands for the whole frame.
Finally, in (25) it is the location where the event takes place (i.e. London), which stands for the whole event (i.e. He lived in London), which, in tum, stands for the time at which that event took place '^.
Since different elements of the event and state frames can be found to función as source domains in metonymic mappings underlying time expressions, it should be possible to build a taxonomy of specifíc metonymies of time based on the different types of events and states and their constituent elements. The following is a firts and tentative attempt to do so. In order to carry out this task, I shall make use of Dik's (1989: 89) comprehensive typology of states of affairs (henceforth SoAs)''. Five parameters are used in the construction of this classification of SoAs: +/-dynamic: depending on whether the SoA involves any change. +/-telic: depending on whether the SoA reaches a natural terminal point. +/-momentaneous: depending on whether an event is conceived as having duration. +/-control: depending on whether the first argument of an SoA has the power to determine whether or not the SoA will obtain. +/-experience: depending on whether an SoA cannot obtain but through the sensory or mental faculties of some animate being.
TTie application of these parameters yields the following typology of SoAs: Figure 6 . Typology of states of affairs (Dik, 1989: 98)' " No comprehensive typology of SoAs has been specified within the Cognitive Linguistics framework. To the best of our knowledge, the only attempt to date was made by Langacker (1987) , who made a distinction between atemporal relations, on the ene hand, and perfective and imperfective processes, on the other. The motivation for the decisión of making use of Dik's typology of SoAs is twofold. First, Functional Grammar (FG) offer a highly comprehensive and well-reasoned typology of SoAs. Second, FG displays a significant degree of compatibility with the postulates of Cognitive Linguistics (see Kalisz and Kubinski, 1997 for a detailed comparison of these two approaches to language.
' •* The distinction +/-momentaneous only affects the category of [+telic] Events and the resulting types of events receive no special nomenclature within Diks's classification. The +/-Let US now present a tentative taxonomy of time metonymies in English by considering each of the subcategories of So As in tum ": As the examples above illustrate, positions, states, actions, and processes can all stand metonymically for time (either for sfjecific points in time or for lengths of time). Even though in some cases, the metonymy has been conventionalised to such an extent that it is not noticeable anymore. Thus, in 1.1. when Nixon was living in the White House stands metonymically for «the time/year when Nixon was living in the White House».
SITUATION METONYMIES OF TIME
Regarding the components of each state of affairs, it has been observed that as far as first arguments are concemed, positioners and agents are rarely the source domains of time metonymies, except when their referent is a well-known key historical figure (e.g. Napoleón). Forces, on the contrary, are often the source of time metonymies. As regards second arguments, goals can play the role of source domains, while the processed cannot. Finally, locations are good source domains of time metonymies in the case of positions, but not so when states, actions, and/or processes are involved. Unfortunately, at this point I can only state these differences in metonymic potential among the elements of the event and state frames as interesting linguistic facts about time metonymies without venturing into speculations about the reasons why this is so.
On a final note, it is interesting to draw attention to the fact that the conceptual transfer between the notions of time and event also works in the opposite direction. That is to say, there are occasions on which temporal notions are used as the source domains of metonymic mappings whose target is a certain event. By way of illustration, consider examples like Yesterday was a rough day or We had the time of our Uves. The ñrst utterance should be understood as meaning that the events that took place during the previous day, and not the day itselt, were rough. In the case of the second utterance, the noun «time» refers to an extremely enjoyable experience or event. This transfer from the domain of time to that of events is predictable due to the fact that events occur over time. As illustrated by the quotation from Othello at the beginning of this section, in our westem society time is often conceptualised as a container within whose confines events take place. The metonymy TIME-FOR-EVENTS is thus made possible by the fact that events are just one constituent element of the domain of time.
Conceptual interaction in the conceptualisation of time'"
In sections 2.1 and 2.2, it has been shown how our communication of time-related ideas and our reasoning about time is dependent on metaphoric and metonymic operations on generic models (either of the image-schematic or of the propositional types). In practice, though, the complexity of such an abstract and evanescent concept as time often demands the interaction of both metaphoric and metonymic mappings, or of more than one metaphor or metonymy when thinking and speaking about it. Two examples of such complex conceptual interactions are analysed below. Example (26) "• Interaction between idealised cognitive models is a current issue of discussion. The interaction between metonymic and metaphoric models has been dealt with in a fairly unsystematic way by Goossens (1990) . The metonymic basis of metaphor has been considered m Taylor (1995: 139) and Barcelona (1997) . The most comprehensive and systematic treatment of this subject up to date, however, may be found in Ruiz de Mendoza (1997b) , where this author puts forward a cías-sification of interaction types.
It is part ofour knowledge about actions and activities that they take place over time. In the example above. the action of recording is thus conceptualised as a container in whose interior there is time (the time required to carry out the action). Time within the action-container is seen as a substance. As was expiained in section 2.1, the metaphor TIME IS SUBSTANCE is the result of the image-schema transfonnation known as «multiplicity-to-mass». Finally, the speaker is seen as «grabbing some time» and «taking it out» of the actioncontainer in order to «put it in» the pursuit of a different action, namely, to play at Colchester Hippodrome.
Example (27) shows the interaction between the two types of operational cognitive model. metaphors and metonymies. in the conceptualisation of a complex thought about time ".
(27) Evcr sime I tiirncd 45.1 havc hccn iinahlc to catcli up with the times.
To begin with, there is a metonymy of the type TIME POR STATES, so that the expression «times» stands for the coUection of cultural tendencies and fashions which exist in the society in which the speaker lives "*. Second, «the times» are metaphorically conceptualised as an object moving along a path. Since the English conceptual system includes the metaphor CHANCE IS MOTION ''', the movement of «the times» along the path corresponds to the cultural changes that take place in the speaker's society. Finally, there exists a third metaphor in which time is conceptualised as a competitor (which is, moreover, a subtype of the generic TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT metaphor). Thus, the speaker presents himself as following «the times» along a path and being unable to reach them. As a result of the interaction of a metonymic mapping and three conceptual metaphors, the speaker is able to convey, in an economic and effective way, the idea that he is incapable of following the new fashions and/or cultural tendencies that are in vogue at the time.
" I have adopted tiere ttie useful distinction tietween operational and non-operational idealised cognitive models (or ICMs) which was put forward by Ruiz de Mendoza (19%, 1999a) . Nonoperational ICMs (i.e. propositional ICMs and image-schemas) are static in nature and consist of stored Information. Operational ICMs (i.e. metaphorical and metonymic ICMs) are dynamic and work on the basis of the information provided by non-operational ICMs.
' « The metonymy TIME AT WHICH A CULTURAL TENDENCY TAKES PLACE FOR THE CULTURAL TENDENCY is quite common in everyday expressions such as / could never understand the 60s.
" Other linguistic expressions, included in the Index of Metaphors, which exploit the CHANCE IS MOTION metaphor are, for instance, His hair went grey. He wentfrom laughing to crying. He carne out of a coma. etc.
FINAL REMARKS
It is generally accepted that, with the exception of basic domains, most concepts can only be defined and understood by reference to other concepts of a more generic nature ^''. Thus, non-generic concrete concepts are understood by means of their profiling against other more generic propositional models. In this connection, Langacker (1987: 148) argües that «finger» is the domain for «knuckle», «hand» for «finger», «arm» for «hand», and finally, «body» is the domain of reference for «arm». In contrast, generic concrete concepts, like «body», and abstract concepts, like «time», cannot be reduced to other generic propositional models. The mechanisms of reduction which enable their comprehension are, instead, those of metonymic and metaphoric projection. As has been shown in relation to the concept of time, the source domains of these mappings are either generic abstract concepts like those of «event», «action», «situation», etc., or image-schemata such as «container», «path», «near-far», «forcé» and the luce.
Moreover, this paper has shown the impossibility of breaking free from the use of conceptual metaphors and metonymies in reasoning and speeiking about time in English. On the basis of a coUection of over 400 instances of time-related expressions, a systematic description of the systems of metaphors and metonymies of time in English has been put forward. In doing so, this paper contributes significant evidence supporting the line of thought which regards time as a non-basic notion. In addition, other related topics, like the existence of metaphorical cluster models, or the relevance of conceptual interaction for complex abstract domain expression have also been dealt with and shown to support the time-as-a-derived notion position.
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™ I have preferred to make use of the term «generic concept» or «domain» to refer to Langacker's «abstract domains», that is to say, to refer to those domains which are at the top of a conceptual hierarchy and can be used as reference domains in order to define other lower level concepts. I would rather avoid the use of the term abstract in Langaclcer's sense, since both generic and non-generic concepts can have different degrees of abstraction. By way of illustration, both «ani-mal» and «action» are generic domains, but the latter is more clearly abstract than the former. The term abstract will be used here with its original meaning to describe those concepts which do not have a clear referen! in the outside world.
